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Abstract
Fifteen years after German reunification, the facts about slow re-
gional convergence have born out the prediction of Barro (1991), ex-
cept that migration out of East Germany has not slowed down. I
document that in particular the 18-29 year old are leaving East Ger-
many, and that the emigration has accelerated in recent years. To
understand these patterns, I provide an extension of the standard la-
bor search model by allowing for migration and network externalities.
In that theory, two equilibria can result: one with a high networking
rate, high average labor productivity, low unemployment and no em-
igration (“West Germany”) and one with a low networking rate, low
average labor productivity, high unemployment and a constant rate of
emigration (“East Germany”). The model does not imply any obvi-
ously sound policies to move from the weakly networked equilibrium
to the highly networked equilibrium.
Keywords: German reunification, labor market search, network exter-
nalities, migration, regional economics
to the participants in the macroeconomics seminar in Toulouse for useful questions and to
Olivier Blanchard, Nicola Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Claudia Buch and Russell Cooper for useful
comments.
Regional labor markets, network externalities and migration: the
case of German reunification.
1 German reunification: 15 years later.
Germany was divided into three parts: West Germany, East Germany and
Berlin. These three parts have been united together on October 3rd, 1990.
Many forecasts regarding the future of Germany have been made then, rang-
ing from the enthusiastic to the dour. 15 years later, it is time to take stock
of what has happened since.
Among the most skeptical forecasts, Barro (1991) in a Wall Street Jour-
nal op-ed piece warned against too much optimism regarding the speed at
which East Germany will catch up with West Germany. He argued that pro-
ductivity in the East will catch up to West German levels only at “1 1/2 to
2 percentage points per year”. He argued that this ”will create pressures for
the German government to speed up the process. There is, however little ...
to suggest that governments can accelerate convergence.”. He finally stated,
that “the flow of migrants will ... decline over time. The annual number of
net migrants will fall to a range of 140,000-230,000 by the year 2001.”
Unfortunately, Barro was right for most of his predictions. Average labor
productivity in East Germany (without Berlin) for 2001 to 2003 is approxi-
mately two thirds the average labor productivity of the West Germany, with
the productivity growth rate differential for 1999 to 2003 at 1.6%, in line
with or only slightly better than Barro’s prediction. Fiscal transfers into
East Germany have been massive, for a total transfer of nearly one trillion
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Euros from West to East Germany from 1991 to 2003, averaging close to 37%
of East German GDP throughout. These transfers may have improved the
lifes of East Germans, but they do not seem to have accelerated convergence.
If anything, the anemic growth of Germany during the last 15 years may be
due to these transfers, see Canova and Ravn (2000) or Sinn (2002).
The average net migration rate for 2001-2003 of approximately 73 thou-
sand (subtracting an average inflow of 134 thousand from an average outflow
of 207 thousand) is close to the average of the preceeding ten years: only the
gross flows are as high as Barro predicted. It seems likely that the large fiscal
transfers acted as a “bribe” to the East Germans to mostly stay where they
were, keeping them from competing against West Germans for jobs at lower
wages, or to lure West Germans to come. But the more discomforting fact
here is that migration has not slowed down, which makes matters even worse
than Barro predicted. While the population in West Germany is growing,
it is shrinking in East Germany. The differential of the population growth
rates (excluding Berlin) is 1%, whether one calculates it for 1991 to 2004 or
just for the last five of these years.
To investigate the issue of inner-German migration further, I have ex-
amined regional data available from the Statistisches Bundesamt. A more
detailed presentation of this data as well as the model below is in Uhlig
(2006). Further investigations of East-West-German migration and commut-
ing is presented in Hunt (2006) and Izem and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2006).
For each district or “Kreis” in Germany, each year from 1995 to 2003
and several age groups, data is available on reallocations crossing its border.
For 2003, detailed population data is available. Whenever the district name
contained the word “Stadt”, the German word for city, I have categorized it
as a city (or a “large city”, if the population exceeded 100000), otherwise as
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countryside, although much of it presumably also serves as extended suburbs.
The population splits 80-20 between West and East, and 28%, 3% and 68%
across large cities, small cities and countryside.
While all groups tend to leave East Germany, except for the above-50-year
olds, the numbers are particularly large for the 18-29 year old, i.e. the future
work force, see figure 1. There is an exodus of these people in particular
from small cities and rural East Germany, in contrast to the pattern in West
Germany. On average for the last five years in the data, 1.9% of the 18-29
year old left East Germany excluding Berlin for Berlin and West Germany,
and their migration appears to accelerate rather than slow down. This is not
compensated for by middle-age families with young children. The 30-49 year
old are also leaving on net, albeit at a slower rate. Additionally, the birth
rates per female in East Germany from 1991 to 2004 is only about two thirds
of the (already low) birth rate in West Germany, and only slowly catching
up. It appears that East Germany is slowly but surely aging and dying,
except for a few vibrant core areas and big cities.
Furthermore, the slow convergence of the East to the West should perhaps
surprise more than usual. The disparity between East and West Germany is
not the result of many years of a gradual drifting-apart - as is the case for
the regions analyzed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Rather, here are
two parts of the same country, one of which has been held back artifically
during the postwar years. This is similar to the distinction between choosing
or being assigned to a civil service job, exploited by Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and
Schu¨ndeln (2005) to measure risk-aversion. What is therefore needed is a
theory consistent with the following stylized facts. There is persistent mi-
gration from East to West Germany, in particular by the age group 18 to 29.
Unemployment in East Germany is higher than in West Germany. Wages
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are lower in East Germany. Average labor productivity is lower in East Ger-
many. The welfare system provides for comparable benefits in East and West
Germany to short- and long-term unemployed workers. There have been and
continue to be sizeable fiscal transfers from West to East Germany. Legal
and educational differences between East and West Germany are minor.
2 A model of regional labor markets, network
externalities and migration.
Surely, market distortions and policy interference in East Germany have
been big, see Snower and Merkl (2006) and adjustment costs are large, see
Burda (2006). But should we be confident that East Germany would recover
quickly, if all these policy distortions were to be removed? The model in
this section provides a simple framework to show that this may not be so.
It shows that one region (East Germany) can have higher unemployment,
lower productivity and persistent outward migration compared to another
region (West Germany) and without any convergence taking place, despite
the absence of policy distortions or costs to moving factors of production
(while the latter is the main cause of the slowdown of convergence in Burda,
2006). Workers also do not suddenly become more skilled by moving from
East to West. Rather, I argue, that agglomeration effects play a key role, see
also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) and Cooper (1999).
A standard labor search model would predict that the initially higher un-
employment in the East should attract relatively more vacancy creation than
in the West. Migration would provide for an additional valve. Something
more is needed. I therefore extend the standard labor search model to allow
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for migration as well as network externalities of production. I closely follow
the notation and exposition of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), section
4. I will only study steady-state equilibria with constant shares of each type
of worker in the population of the region, and therefore leave away time sub-
scripts, unless necessary. The model is described as a partial equilibrium in
the sense that the destination region for migration is not modelled explicitly,
but it will be obvious at the end how this could be done.
For the network externalities, consider a match of a worker and a firm. In
isolation, production is assumed to be ym (m for “match”). I assume that it is
beneficial for this pair to join a network of enterprises and specialize on some
specific task. Thus, as part of a network, the production by this pair is now
assumed to be yn > ym (n for “network”). Joining a network is probabilistic.
I assume that this probability depends on the ratio of non-networked firm-
worker-pairs mt to networked firm-worker pairs nt: this turns out to make
the model fairly tractable. Thus, let ν = ν(mt/nt) be the instantaneous
probability for a non-networked firm-worker match to become part of some
network of firms. Division of labor is beneficial to all: so, the larger the
networks, the better. There is no rivalry in joining a network. Furthermore,
the more networks are already present, the larger shall be the chance of an
unmatched firm to join one. I therefore assume that ν(·) is decreasing. For
simplicity, I assume that ν = νh > 0 for mt/nt ≤ ψ and 0 ≤ ν = νl < νh for
mt/nt > ψ and some value ψ > 0, satisfying
νlψ < λ < νhψ(1)
where λ is the exogenous job separation rate for (networked) firm-worker
matches. I shall write ν, keeping in mind, that this can take one of the two
values. I will calculate the equilibrium for a “guess” for ν and then determine
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ν with the equilibrium ratio of mt to nt. The emergence and importance
of clusters in East Germany has recently been studied and documented in
Rosenfeld et al. (2004).
For the migration part, I assume that agents have the option of moving
from the region under consideration to some other outside region. Agents
experience a disutility κ > 0 from moving, expressed in wage-equivalent units.
I assume that a new disutility level κ′ is drawn iid from some distribution
F (κ) at the rate φ. Let U be the value to an unemployed worker in the
region under consideration (“East Germany”) and let U¯ be the value to
an unemployed worker in the destination region (“West Germany”). Upon
receiving a new draw of the disutility κ, the worker will move, iff U ≤ U¯ −κ.
Let κ∗ be value, for which equality is achieved. I shall ignore the immigration
term, and approximate it per ι = 0 for simplicity.
The other features are standard and are taken from Rogerson, Shimer
and Wright (2005), section 4, modified to allow for non-networked as well as
networked matches. I assume that workers can be unemployed, or produce
in a match. While unemployed, workers receive benefits b. Firms can post
vacancies at a flow cost rk per unit of time of posting the vacancy. There
is free entry to posting vacancies. Let u be the mass of unemployed workers
and v the mass of vacancies. Matching between vacant positions and workers
happens according to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function. I write
αw = αw (v/u) for the rate at which unemployed workers find a job, and
αe = αe (v/u) = αw (v/u) /(v/u) be the rate, at which vacancies are filled,
with αw(·) increasing and αe(·) decreasing in their argument.
In a match, continuous bargaining assures that the worker receives a share
0 < θ < 1 of the joint remaining surplus from production, which I denote
with Sm for matched, but not yet networked firm-worker pairs, and Sn for
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networked firm-worker pairs. I assume that there is an exogenous separation
rate λ, regardless of whether the match is networked or not. I assume that
workers and firms discount the future at rate r.
2.1 Analysis and Results
The value of being unemployed is given by
rU = b˜+ αwθSm(2)
where
b˜ = b+ φ
∫ κ∗
0
F (κ)dκ
increases the standard unemployment compensation b to b˜ by the “option
value” of moving to the outside region. It depends on U via the migration
threshold κ∗ = U¯ − U .
As in equation (43) of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), it can be
shown that the firm and worker matching rates αe and αw satisfy
r + λ+ αwθ
(1− θ)αe
=
y˜ − b˜
k
(3)
where
y˜ = y˜(ν) = ym +
ν
r + λ+ ν
(yn − ym)(4)
is an average of the labor productivities. Given ν, this equation amounts to
a fixed point problem in κ∗. One can show that there is a unique fixed point
as a continuous function of φ for φ near zero.
Equation (3) shows, that a lower networking rate ν and a larger migration
rate φF (κ∗) both have the effect of discouraging job creation. In particular
and counter-intuitively, the option to migrate increases rather than decreases
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unemployment. This is so because the option to migrate makes workers more
demanding, since they additionally have the alternative to wait for a good
opportunity of moving.
For moderate parameters, only unemployed workers find it beneficial to
move. The population then decreases forever at the constant rate p˙it
pit
=
−φF (κ∗t )u˜, where u˜ is the (constant-in-the-steady-state) unemployment rate
u˜ = u/pi. The equilibrium ratio of mt to nt needs to satisfy
ν
mt
nt
= (λ− φF (κ∗)u˜)(5)
With (1), the calculated equilibrium is consistent with both ν = νl and
ν = νh and the step function assumed above for ν = ν(mt/nt), provided φ
or F (κ∗) is sufficiently small.
There are therefore two equilibria. The “highly networked” equilibrium,
which I call W (“West Germany”), is the equilibrium, in which ν = νh,
unemployment is low, and average labor productivity y˜(ν) is high. In a full
general equilibrium, this equilibrium ought to characterize the destination
region, thus fixing U¯ . The “weakly networked equilibrium”, which I call
E (“East Germany”), features ν = νl, high unemployment and persistent
emigration. The two equilibria balance two offsetting forces. The relatively
higher unemployment in equilibrium E attracts more vacancy creation than
in equilibrium W. However, the surplus from production is lower in the E
equilibrium, due to the lower networking rate, discouraging vacancy creation.
Interestingly, for large enough values of φ, the equilibrium E disappears.
Likewise, the highly networked equilibrium W may disappear with a high
rate of immigration due to overloading the capacity of existing networks to
integrate new members.
8
References
[1] Barro, Robert J. (1991, May 3rd), “Eastern Germany’s long haul,” in
The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones and Company.
[2] Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), Economic Growth,
New York: McGraw-Hill.
[3] Burda, Michael (2006), “What kind of shock was it? Regional integra-
tion of Eastern Germany after unification,” American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, this issue.
[4] Canova, Fabio Canova and Morten Ravn (2000), “The Macroeconomic
Effects of German Unification: Real Adjustments and the Welfare
State,” Review of Economic Dynamics, Academic Press for the Soci-
ety for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 423-460.
[5] Cooper, Russell W. (1999), Coordination Games, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
[6] Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Nicola and Izem, Rima (2006), “What Causes the
Low Labor Productivity in East Germany? A Spatial Analysis.”, draft,
Harvard University.
[7] Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Nicola and Schu¨ndeln, Matthias, (2005), “Precaution-
ary Savings and Self-Selection - Evidence from the German Reunification
”Experiment” ”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 1085-1120.
[8] Hunt, Jennifer (2006), “Staunching Emigration from East Germany:
Age and the Determinants of Migration,” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, forthcoming.
9
[9] Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables (1999), The
Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions and International Trade. MIT Press.
[10] Rogerson, Richard, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright (2005), “Search-
Theoretic Models of the Lsbor Market: a survey,” draft, University of
Pennsylvania.
[11] Rosenfeld, Martin et al. (October 2004), Innovative Kompetenzfelder,
Produktionsnetzwerke und Branchenschwerpunkte der ostdeutschen
Wirtschaft. Endbericht, a study at the Institute fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung
Halle, IWH.
[12] Sinn, Gerlinde and Sinn, Hans-Werner (1993), Kaltstart. Volk-
swirtschaftliche Aspekte der deutschen Vereinigung., 3rd edition, Munich
1993.
[13] Sinn, Hans-Werner (2002), “Germany’s Economic Unification: An As-
sessment after Ten Years,” Review of International Economics, 10(1),
113-128.
[14] Snower, Dennis J. and Merkl, Christian (2006), “The Caring Hand that
Cripples: The East German Labor Market after Reunification,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, this issue.
[15] Uhlig, Harald (2006), “ Regional labor markets, network externalities
and migration: the case of German reunification.”, Sonderforschungs-
bereich 649 Discussion Paper 2006-004, Humboldt Universita¨t zu Berlin.
10
TITLE: East West
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
large cities
small cities
country
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
large cities
small cities
country
Figure 1: CAPTION:Migration patterns of 18-29 year olds in percent of
the 2003 population. The data includes movements from and to Germany.
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Technical Appendix
The technical appendix is essentially a longer version of the shorter, main
paper, providing additional detail and discussion.
A German reunification: 15 years later.
Germany was divided into three parts: West Germany, East Germany and
Berlin. These three parts have been united together on October 3rd, 1990.
15 years later, it is time to take stock of what has happened since. Fiscal
transfers into East Germany have been massive. According to Busch (2002)
for 1991 to 1999, own calculations for 2003, and a linear interpolation for
2000 to 2002, a total net transfer of 940 billion Euros has been paid from
West to East Germany for the time span from 1991 to 2003. Figure 3 shows
that the transfers have been more than one third of East German GDP on
average: indeed, the absolute amount of the transfers has been steadily rising
or barely falling for most of these years. While approximately 20% of the
(gross) transfers have been used to pay for subsidies to firms as well as to
building infrastructure, approximately 50% have taken the form of direct
transfers for socio-political reasons. Due to the East-West transfers, the per-
resident fiscal budget of the East German Bundesla¨nder is approximately
15% higher than in the West. These transfers have been financed mostly
with an increase in debt. Additionally, a “solidarity tax” has raised a total
of nearly 90 billion Euros from 1991 to 2000.
Despite (or, possibly, because) of these transfers, convergence of condi-
tions in East Germany to those in the West have been slow. Indeed, Canova
and Ravn (2000) have shown, that reunification is tantamount to a mass
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migration of low-skilled agents holding no capital into a foreign country. Us-
ing an extension of standard neoclassical growth theory, they show how this
should have let to an investment boom in the absence of a welfare state, but
a prolonged recession in its presence. Thus, the anemic growth in Germany
and many of the reunification problems may possibly find their cause rather
than their remedy in these massive transfers to the East. This also echoes the
warning of Sinn and Sinn (1993), reiterated in Sinn (2002), against raising
the wages in East Germany too quickly to West German levels.
The slow rate of convergence between regions is another matter, however.
Germany is not unusual in this respect. For disparate regions in a country,
the slow convergence process has been documented e.g. by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin in a series of papers, summarized in their book (1995). Based on
this research, Barro (1991) warned against too much optimism regarding
the speed at which East Germany will catch up with West Germany in a
Wall Street Journal op-ed piece. He stated then that “there are substantial
variations in estimates of East German productivity in 1990; a reasonable
range is from one-third to one-half the West German figure. An extrapolation
of the U.S. experience to the eastern regions of unified Germany implies that
per-capita growth in the East would be initially 1 1/2 to 2 percentage points
per year higher than in the West. This growth advantage ... means that it
will take about 15 years to eliminate one-half of the gap ... If so, the East
would eventually catch up to the West, but in a couple of generations rather
than a couple of years or a couple of decades.” Barro’s forecast turns out
to be close to the current facts. 10 to 15 years after reunification, average
labor productivity in East Germany (without Berlin) for 2001 to 2003 is at
approximately two thirds the average labor productivity of West Germany
(without Berlin), and therefore pretty much exactly where Barro predicted
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it would be. Likewise, the productivity growth rate differential between East
Germany (without Berlin) and West Germany (without Berlin) for 1999 to
2003 is 1.6%, in line with Barro’s prediction.
The prediction in the Wall Street Journal appears to be a slight mis-
print, however. Given a convergence rate of 2% annually, one finds that
exp(−.02n) = .75 is solved by n = 14.4 and exp(−.02n) = .5 is solved by
n = 34.7. I.e., in 15 years, only a quarter of the productivity gap should
have been eliminated, and it would take 35 years to eliminate half of it. This
indeed is the (corrected) statement in Barro (1996), p.14, with an update
of the analysis in Barro (2002). Compared to that calculation, productivity
convergence appears to be faster, at first blush. Figure 2 provides greater
detail, using the numbers from Burda (2006). Productivity convergence ap-
pears to have been fast from 1991 to 1993, so the prediction based on the
1991 numbers is far from the facts. Applying the prediction on the basis of
the numbers for 1993, however, works surprisingly well. Whether the fast
productivity growth in 1993 is due to mismeasurement prior to that date,
whether this is due to low-productivity enterprises having simply been shut
down, or whether there really has been a rather dramatic catchup in pro-
ductivity in 1991 to 1993 might be an interesting subject of further research.
My guess is that the former two explanations are far more likely than the
latter. I conclude from this, tentatively, that the productivity convergence
prediction by Barro was right, subject to a productivity jump between 1991
and 1993, probably due to some data revision or firm-closing.
His other prediction - the slowdown of migration - did not (yet) pan
out, though, see figure 4. Barro stated that “the flow of migrants will ...
decline over time for two reasons: first, the East’s per-capita income will
rise, if slowly, relative to the West’s; and second, cumulated migration will
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cause the West’s population density to rise relative to the East’s, thereby
making the West relatively less attractive. The combination of these two
forces implies that the annual number of net migrants will fall to a range
of 140,000-230,000 by the year 2001; the projected cumulative number of
migrants for the period 1991-2001 is 1.7 to 2.8 million.”. Migration from
East to West Germany was never quite as high: the total was approximately
0.7 million from 1991-2001, and the average migration rate for 2001-2003
of approximately 70 thousand is close to the average of the preceeding ten
years. One interpretation is that East Germans were initially “bribed” with
the huge transfers to stay where they are, and that we now witness residual
pent-up migration, as these transfers are scheduled to be gradually phased
out. Another possibility is that migration from East to West Germany will
continue to persist, turning East Germany into a deserted wasteland, except
for a few industrial core regions. Since these migratory pattern differ from
those predicted by Barro, I shall investigate them more closely in section B.
I find that migration is particularly strong for the age group of 18 to 29 year
olds, and it is particularly strong from the country side and small cities, and
much stronger than the corresponding pattern for West Germany. It appears
that East Germany is slowly but surely gentrifying and dying.
In light of the analyses of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, one may be tempted
to explain this pattern within the context of standard endogenous growth
theories, in line with the usual explanation of slow regional convergence.
But something is amiss. The disparity between East and West Germany
is not the result of many years of a gradual drifting-apart - as it is the case for
the disparate regions in West Germany, the United States or Japan, which
Barro and Sala-i-Martin have analyzed. Rather, here are two parts of the
same country, one of which has been held back artifically during the postwar
15
years1.
The regions are homogenous in many ways - the same climate, the same
legal system, the same language and a similar level of general education.
Technologies and blueprints can easily be transferred, capital can easily be
moved. The slow rate of convergence of East to West Germany strikes me
as more surprising than usual. In sum, what is needed is a theory consistent
with the following stylized facts:
1. There is persistent migration from East to West Germany, in particular
by the age group 18 to 29.
2. Unemployment in East Germany is higher than in West Germany.
3. Wages are lower in East Germany.
4. Average labor productivity is lower in East Germany.
5. The welfare system provides for comparable benefits in East and West
Germany to short- and long-term unemployed workers.
6. There have been and continue to be sizeable fiscal transfers from West
to East Germany.
7. East and West Germany operate subject to the same federal law. Re-
gional differences in the legal system and regulations are minor.
8. Regional differences in the educational system are minor.
1This is similar to the distinction between risk-averse agents self-selecting into civil
service job in West Germany and former East Germans being given a civil service job
in East Germany, a distinction exploited by Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) to
calculate the impact of risk aversion on occupational choice.
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9. Real estate is cheaper in East Germany.
It certainly is the case that the job-specific skills and training of the
workers in the East were not suitable to the new capitalist world of the West.
However, the current generation of 18 to 29 year olds, which are leaving East
Germany in large numbers, were small children or at most teenagers by
the time German reunification happened: their education and job-specific
training should be on par with that of their age-compatriots in the West. It
is conceivable, that the only way for them to receive apprenticeship training
is to move to westwards - but then again, why do firms not move eastwards,
exploiting the cost advantage of lower real estate prices, lower wages and
compensation?
What I seek is a theory of two otherwise identical regions, but where
one region has higher unemployment and lower average productivity than
the other, and where there is continuous, unceasing migration from the low-
productivity to the high-productivity region. A standard labor search model
would predict that the initially higher unemployment in the East should
attract relatively more vacancy creation than in the West. Extending such a
model to a two-region world with migration between them would add another
valve for releasing the pressure of inequality and would eventually simply
result in an equalization of the conditions in both regions. Furthermore,
a reasonable parameterization would imply that this convergence happens
quickly. Something more is required to make the differences persist.
Two devices come to mind. The first is costly signalling, see e.g. Spence
(1973). High-quality young workers may wish to signal their high quality by
the costly move to the West, whereas the low-quality young workers remain
behind. I find it a bit hard to believe, however, that the informational
asymmetries between firms and prospective employers could be so massive.
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The second device is some kind of complementarity. One possibility is
a regional sorting according to the quality of its inhabitants, as in Kremer
(1993). A second possibility is a network externality between producing
firms. While firms can produce in isolation, selling their products on some
anonymous market, they can often be more productive by specialization as
part of a larger network of firms. A hotel can outsource many of its services
like cleaning or repairs, provided such services are available from specialized
firms close by. A machine or car manufacturer may outsource the production
of specialized parts.
In section C , I provide such a model, extending the standard labor search
model to allow for emigration as well as network externalities of production.
The model has two equilibria. The “highly networked” equilibrium is the
equilibrium, in which unemployment is low and average labor productivity
is high, characterizing the destination region (“West Germany”, “vibrant
city”, “industrial core”) for migrants. The “weakly networked equilibrium”
by contrast is characterized by high unemployment and persistent emigration.
The possibility to emigrate weakens job creation further, as the option value
of emigration acts like an added unemployment benefit. One may want to
think of this equilibrium as characterizing “East Germany”. Emigration in
this model never stops, eventually turning a dying region into a wasteland.
B Facts on Inner-German migration.
The general pattern of migration from East to West Germany since 1991 is
shown in figure 4. The data counts East Berlin as part of East Germany
before 2000, and all of Berlin from 2000 onwards. What is remarkable about
this picture is that migration from East to West Germany has not come
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to rest after the initial post-unification wave. Rather, and since 1997, net
emigration from East Germany has increased again. Slowly, but gradually,
East Germany is shrinking in population, compared to the West.
Further investigations of East-West-German migration and commuting is
presented in Hunt (2006) and Izem and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2006). Here, in
order to examine the issue of inner-German migration further, I have exam-
ined regional data available from the “‘Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der
La¨nder”, available per https://www.regionalstatistik.de/genesis/online/logon.
Germany is divided into 439 “Kreise” or regions, including the city states
Berlin and Hamburg. For each Kreis, each year from 1995 to 2003 and several
age groups, data is available on emigration and immigration, i.e., realloca-
tions crossing the border of the Kreis. Furthermore, for 2003, detailed pop-
ulation data is available. The data lists the names for each Kreis. Whenever
it contained the word “Stadt”, the German word for city, I have categorized
the Kreis as a city, otherwise as countryside. Obviously, the “countryside”
should properly be regarded also as serving as an extended suburb. Given
modern possibilities for commuting, the distinction is blurred, certainly in a
densely populated country such as Germany. Following the usual convention,
I have categorized cities with a total population in 2003 of more than 100.000
as a large city and below that as a small city. The distribution across the
various categories can be seen in table 1.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the city sizes in East and West, plotting
the log of the fraction of cities above a certain size versus the log of that size.
As is well-known as Zipf’s law, one often obtains a fairly straight line, see
e.g. Krugman (1996) or Gabaix and Ioannides (2004): the same is true here.
Next, I calculate the migration rates of subpopulations within each of
these categories and for various age groups, expressed in percent of the 2003
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All East West
Total Population:
Number of “Kreise” 439 113 326
popul. in % of total 100 20 80
Large Cities:
Number of “Kreise” 70 12 58
popul. in % of region 28 35 27
... without Berlin, Hamburg:
Number of “Kreise” 68 11 57
popul. in % of region 22 15 24
Small Cities:
Number of “Kreise” 46 15 31
popul. in % of region 3 6 3
Countryside:
Number of “Kreise” 323 86 237
popul. in % of region 68 59 71
Table 1: Distribution of the population in Germany.
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population. Figure 8 shows a key pattern: the future work force of East
Germany, i.e., the population aged 18 to 29 years, is leaving East Germany
in large numbers. While there is considerable “churning”, i.e., while gross
flows are considerably larger than net flows, there is little doubt that gradu-
ally and persistently, East Germany is shrinking in the relevant working-age
population. This is also corroborated by figure 6: essentially, only people
above age 50 stay in East Germany, all others gradually leave. Note also,
that the migration pattern of people below 17 is nearly identical to the mi-
gration pattern of the group aged 30-49, since the former are the children of
the latter. I therefore do not plot this age group in the other figures.
In figure 6, migrants crossing the German border are included. This
makes a substantial difference, as a visual comparison to 4 already shows.
While the latter shows persistent emigration from East to West Germany, 6
seems to indicate that there was net positive immigration until about 1997.
Thus, figure 7 shows only the numbers for inner-German migration. The
numbers now look bleaker, as it excludes a fairly large number of immigrants
to East Germany from foreign countries. Since both types of numbers shed
different light on the phenomenon, I included both throughout. For example,
figure 9 is the companion figure to figure 8.
The fact that East Germans are leaving East Germany is particularly true
for the country side. Figure 10 compares the migration patterns for various
regions and age groups in East and West Germany. Figure 11 concentrates on
inner-German migrants, i.e., excludes migration crossing the German border.
While the country side provides a stable or even growing environment in West
Germany, there is an exodus of young people in rural East Germany. Cities
are generally attractive to young people, but more so in the West, while
people above 30 and their young children (not shown) leave East German
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city at a faster rate than in the West. Figure 12 and figure 13 (for only
inner-German migration) focusses on the migration pattern of people at age
18 to 29, showing both the rates (in percent of the 2003 population) as well
as the cummulative effect. The cummulative effect needs to be taken with
the caveat, that people age, i.e., the group of 18-29 year olds is replenished
by young children, as they age, etc.. Nonetheless, the implied changes in
the population of East Germany, in particular, rural East Germany, and
the generational composition of this population is shifting dramatically and
continues to do so, 15 years after reunification.
C A model of labor search, migration and
network externalities: Details.
C.1 The model
To shed light on these phenomena, I consider an extension of the standard
labor search model. Surely, market distortions and policy interference in East
Germany have been big, see Snower and Merkl (2006) and adjustment costs
are large, see Burda (2006). But should we be confident that East Germany
would recover quickly, if all these policy distortions were to be removed? The
model in this section provides a simple framework to show that this may not
be so. It shows that one region (East Germany) can have higher unem-
ployment, lower productivity and persistent outward migration compared to
another region (West Germany) and without any convergence taking place,
despite the absence of policy distortions or costs to moving factors of pro-
duction (while the latter is the main cause of the slowdown of convergence in
Burda, 2006). Workers also do not suddenly become more skilled by moving
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from East to West. Rather, I argue, that agglomeration effects play a key
role, see also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Krugman (1996) and
Cooper (1999).
A standard labor search model would predict that the initially higher
unemployment in the East should attract relatively more vacancy creation
than in the West. Migration would provide for an additional valve. Some-
thing more is needed. I therefore extend the standard labor search model to
allow for migration as well as network externalities of production. I closely
follow the notation and exposition of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005),
section 4. I will only study steady-state equilibria with constant shares of
each type of worker in the population of the region, and therefore leave away
time subscripts, unless necessary. I need to be careful in formulating the
assumptions in order for a steady state to exist. The model is described as a
partial equilibrium in the sense that the destination region for migration is
not modelled explicitly, but it will be obvious at the end how this could be
done.
For the network externalities, consider a match of a worker and a firm. In
isolation, production is assumed to be ym (m for “match”). I assume that it is
beneficial for this pair to join a network of enterprises and specialize on some
specific task. Thus, as part of a network, the production by this pair is now
assumed to be yn > ym (n for “network”). Joining a network is probabilistic.
I assume that this probability depends on the ratio of non-networked firm-
worker-pairs mt to networked firm-worker pairs nt: this turns out to make
the model fairly tractable. Thus, let ν = ν(mt/nt) be the instantaneous
probability for a non-networked firm-worker match to become part of some
network of firms. Division of labor is beneficial to all: so, the larger the
networks, the better. There is no rivalry in joining a network. Furthermore,
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the more networks are already present, the larger shall be the chance of an
unmatched firm to join one. I therefore assume that ν(·) is decreasing. For
simplicity, I assume that ν = νh > 0 for mt/nt ≤ ψ and 0 ≤ ν = νl < νh for
mt/nt > ψ and some value ψ > 0, satisfying
νlψ < λ < νhψ(6)
where λ is the exogenous job separation rate for (networked) firm-worker
matches. I shall write ν, keeping in mind, that this can take one of the two
values. I will calculate the equilibrium for a “guess” for ν and then determine
ν with the equilibrium ratio of mt to nt.
For the migration part, I assume that agents have the option of moving
from the region under consideration to some other outside region. Agents
experience a disutility κ > 0 from moving, expressed in wage-equivalent
units. I assume that with some instantaneous probability φ, a new disutility
level κ′ is drawn iid from some distribution F (κ). Let U be the value to an
unemployed worker in the region under consideration (“East Germany”) and
let U¯ be the value to an unemployed worker in the destination region (“West
Germany”). Upon receiving a new draw of the disutility κ, the worker will
move, iff U ≤ U¯ − κ. Let κ∗ be value, for which equality is achieved. This
modelling assumption can be seen as a rather stylized way of capturing the
fact that young people in practice find it easier to move for a variety of reasons
- family considerations, social networks, habits, etc. - than older people.
With this interpretation, the probability φ is the probability of “rebirth”,
with an age ( parameterized as moving disutility) randomly drawn from the
population distribution. The alternative would be to model a labor search
market with life-cycle considerations which gets elaborate fairly quickly. I
let ι be the rate of immigration into the region. For the West, ι should be
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thought of as positive. Since migration is from East to West Germany, and
since West Germany is about three times as large as East Germany, I shall
ignore the immigration term, and use the approximation ι = 0 for simplicity.
The other features are standard and are taken from Rogerson, Shimer
and Wright (2005), section 4, modified to allow for non-networked as well as
networked matches. I assume that workers can be unemployed, or produce
in a match. While unemployed, workers receive benefits b. Firms can post
vacancies at a flow cost rk per unit of time of posting the vacancy. There
is free entry to posting vacancies. Let u be the mass of unemployed workers
and v the mass of vacancies. Matching between vacant positions and workers
happens according to a constant-returns-to-scale matching function. I write
αw = αw (v/u) for the rate at which unemployed workers find a job, and
αe = αe (v/u) = αw (v/u) /(v/u) be the rate, at which vacancies are filled,
with αw(·) increasing and αe(·) decreasing in their argument.
In a match, continuous bargaining assures that the worker receives a share
0 < θ < 1 of the joint remaining surplus from production, which I denote
with Sn for matched, but not yet networked firm-worker pairs, and Sn for
networked firm-worker pairs. I assume that there is an exogenous separation
rate λ, regardless of whether the match is networked or not. I assume that
workers and firms discount the future at rate r.
C.2 Analysis and Results
The value of being unemployed is given by
rU = b+ φχ(κ∗) + αwθSm(7)
where
χ(κ∗) = F (κ∗)
(
U¯ − U − E [κ | κ ≤ κ∗]
)
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=
∫ κ∗
0
F (κ)dκ
is the “option value” of moving to the outside region. It depends on U via the
cutoff-level κ∗ = U¯ − U . Equation (7) shows that the possibility of moving
to another region is tantamount to increasing the benefit level b to
b˜ = b+ φχ(κ∗)
since the option value of moving increases the value of being unemployed2.
The two equations for the surplus Sm and Sn are given by
(r + λ+ ν)Sm = ym − rU + νSn
(r + λ)Sn = yn − rU
I.e., the flow value of the surplus in the networked state is given by current
production minus the flow value of being unemployed (noting that the value
of a firm is zero, due to free entry). The flow value of the surplus in the non-
networked state also reflects the possibility of transiting into the networked
state.
These two equations can be combined to yield
(r + λ)Sm = y˜ − rU(8)
where
y˜ = y˜(ν) = ym +
ν
r + λ+ ν
(yn − ym)(9)
2Equation (7) can be seen from the heuristic equation
U ≈ b+ exp−r∆t
(
(1− (φ+ αw)∆t)U + φ∆t
∫
κ
max{U, U¯ − κ}dF (κ) + (αw∆t)θSm
)
as ∆t→ 0.
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is an average of the labor productivities3. A higher rate of joining a net-
work increases ceteris paribus the surplus in the same way that a higher
productivity would.
The vacancy posting condition is given per
k = αe(1− θ)Sm(10)
As in equation (43) of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005), it follows that
the matching rates αe and αw satisfy
r + λ+ αwθ
(1− θ)αe
=
y˜ − b˜
k
(11)
This equation amounts to a fixed point problem. Given a “guess” for the
cut-off value κ∗, calculate χ(κ∗). Under standard conditions on the matching
function, the left-hand side has a unique solution for the matching rates
αw = αw (v/u) and αe = αe (v/u) and the ratio of vacancies to unemployment
v/u. Given values for αe and αw, calculate Sm and U per (10) and (8), and
calculate a new value for κ∗ = U¯ − U . This new value has to be consistent
with the initial “guess” in order for this to be a valid fixed point. Given that
there is a unique solution, if φ = 0, a standard perturbation argument then
shows that there is a unique fixed point as a continuous function of φ for φ
near zero.
Equation (11) provides a number of key insights into this model. The
averaged labor productivity y˜ and the “modified” unemployment benefit b˜ =
3This averaged labor productivity y˜ is generally slightly different from the population
average labor productivity, which is given by
ya = ym +
ν
λ− φF (κ∗) + ν
(yn − ym)
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b − φχ(κ∗) play the same role as in the standard model, and provide the
channel for the networking and migration effects here. A lower networking
rate ν and a larger migration rate φχ(κ∗) both have the effect of discouraging
job creation, decreasing the job matching rate αw for workers, increasing the
vacancy filling rate αe for firms and thus increasing the surplus of a non-
networked match Sm according to equation (10). A lower job matching rate
αw decreases the value of being unemployed U and consequently increases
the migration treshold κ∗, i.e. makes emigration more likely.
For the dynamics of the population of workers, let ut be the mass of
unemployed workers, and recall that mt is the mass of workers in a non-
networked match and nt the mass of workers in networked matches. The
evolution of these masses is given by the differential equations4
u˙t = −(φF (κ
∗
t ) + αw,t)ut + λ(mt + nt)
m˙t = αw,tut − (ν + λ)mt
n˙t = νmt − λnt
(where it may be good to recall that immigration has been assumed or ap-
proximated to be zero). Generally, there will be migration out of the region,
and therefore, ut, mt and nt will not have a constant steady state. Let
pit = ut +mt + nt
4I implicitely assume that only unemployed workers find it beneficial to move, if they
draw a low value for the moving cost. Other interesting possibilites are not analyzed
here. For example, if the discrepancy between the two regions is large enough, the value of
having work U+θSm or even U+θSn for networked firms in the region under consideration
may be lower than the value U¯ of being unemployed in the destination region. In that
case, agents drawing a sufficiently low moving cost will quit their current job and move.
This additional reason for job separation would give rise to modifications of the surplus
calculations above.
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be the total population in the region. Define
u˜t =
ut
pit
, m˜t =
mt
pit
, n˜t =
nt
pit
as the shares of the total population of workers for each of the three possibil-
ities. I shall concentrate on the case where these shares are constant. Note
that the rate of population decrease is given by
p˙it
pit
= −φF (κ∗t )u˜t(12)
With a constant share of unemployed u˜t ≡ u˜, the population decreases ex-
ponentially.
Let uˆt be the relative change of u˜t, i.e., the time derivative of u˜t divided
by u˜t. Define mˆt and nˆt likewise. Exploiting e.g. uˆt = u˙t/ut − p˙it/pit
and imposing uˆt ≡ 0, mˆt ≡ 0 and nˆt ≡ 0 yields
u˜αw = (1− u˜)(λ− φF (κ
∗)u˜)(13)
νm˜ = (λ− φF (κ∗)u˜) n˜(14)
1 = u˜+ m˜+ n˜(15)
Given the solution for κ∗ and αw, the first equation is a quadratic equation
for u˜, with the relevant of the two solutions coinciding with the standard
solution
u˜→
λ
λ+ αw
(16)
as φ → 0. Given u˜, the remaining two linear equations can now be solved
for m˜ and n˜.
With equation (11) and for φ sufficiently low, a lower networking rate ν
results in a lower job finding rate αw and a higher emigration rate φF (κ
∗).
Equation (16) furthermore shows that the share of unemployed is also higher.
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Both, the higher unemployment share u˜ as well as the faster emigration rate
result in a faster rate of population decrease, see equation (12).
So far, I have not determined the networking rate ν. A solution to the
equations above exists both for ν = νh and ν = νl. Equation (14) then
shows, that the equilibrium ratio of mt to nt is given by imposing nˆt = 0 in
the equation
nˆt = ν
mt
nt
− (λ− φF (κ∗)u˜)(17)
With (6), the calculated equilibrium is consistent with the step function
assumed above for ν = ν(mt/nt), provided φ or F (κ
∗) is sufficiently small.
A graphical representation of equation (17) is provided in figure 14. There
are two equilibria relevant for our discussion. The “highly networked” equi-
librium is the equilibrium, in which ν = νh, unemployment is low, and average
labor productivity y˜(ν) is high. In a full general equilibrium, this equilib-
rium ought to characterize the destination region (“West Germany”, “vibrant
city”, “industrial core”) for migrants, thus fixing U¯ . In that region, there is
no outward migration. Ignoring inward migration, the equilibrium is given
by the point W in figure 14. The “weakly networked equilibrium”, given by
point E in figure 14, is the network with ν = νl, high unemployment and
persistent emigration. One may want to think of this equilibrium as char-
acterizing “East Germany” or, generally, a dying region. Emigration in this
model never stops, eventually turning a dying region into a wasteland. The
two equilibria balance two offsetting forces. The relatively higher unemploy-
ment in equilibrium E attracts more vacancy creation than in equilibrium
W. However, the surplus from production is lower in the E equilibrium, due
to the lower networking rate, discouraging vacancy creation.
The two other solutions to (17), shown as points A and B in figure 14,
require additional differences between the two regions. At point A, emigra-
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tion persists despite a high networking rate. At point B, no emigration takes
place despite a low networking rate. While point B can be understood as the
equilibrium in an economy without the possibility of emigration to a more
vibrant economy (or with prohibitively high moving costs for all), point A
requires that the destination region remains more attractive, even if the rate
of networking in both regions is equal.
Interestingly, for large enough values of φ, the equilibrium E disappears.
Essentially, if emigration is fast, new matches come on line rarely, and ex-
isting matches are relatively long lived. As a result, networked matches
dominate more than they would in the absence of migration. Whether this
feature should be regarded as a somewhat artificial property of this model or
a valid prediction requires further research5. The flip-side to this argument is
that the highly networked equilibriumW may also disappear with a high rate
of immigration (which we have ignored in the analysis above), as this trig-
gers the creation of many new non-networked firm-worker pairs, overloading
the capacity of existing networks to integrate new members. The slump in
West Germany likely has many causes, but absorbing and integrating a new
workforce arriving from East Germany - as this model would then indicate -
may be one of them.
The emergence and importance of clusters in East Germany has recently
been studied and documented in Rosenfeld et al. (2004). In future research,
their cluster data should be combined with the migration data of section B
to investigate the implications of the theory here empirically.
The networking externality gives rise to a coordination failure in this
model, see e.g. the survey by Cooper (1999). The coordination failure is
5This feature may be useful for constructing a fully dynamic multi-region version of
this model, as it can be utilized to eventually stop the population collapse.
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slightly unusual, though, in that it is not a collective failure of firms to decide
in favour of networking, but rather a problem of congestion. Given the masses
of non-networked and networked firm-worker pairsmt and nt, there is nothing
that can be done further, as the networking rate is assumed to be exogenous.
If there is a coordination failure in this model, then it occurs earlier: given
a certain number of networked firms nt, a lower rate of entry (and thus
higher unemployment!) would result in a higher ratio of networked to non-
networked firms and would trigger the switch to a higher networking rate νh.
One solution would be to tax entry of firms in an already depressed region in
order to give existing but small networks a chance to grow at a healthy pace,
thereby giving the existing unmatched firms a better chance to join. This
is likely stretching the implications of this model too far, though. Rather,
a more detailed modelling of the networking process should be attempted
before embarking on policy recommendations. Structural policies, which
aim at providing fertile grounds for networks of firms, or which encourage
entry of key firms, around which networks can crystalize, then seem likely
candidates for yielding beneficial results.
But skepticism is in order. In his Wall Street Journal op-ed piece on
German reunification, Robert Barro (1991) wrote: “No doubt, the slowness of
the adjustment and the substantial movement of persons will create pressures
for the German government to speed up the process. There is, however little
in the history of regional growth in the U.S. and Western Europe to suggest
that governments can accelerate convergence... . The forces of convergence
are powerful in the long run, but anything approaching parity between eastern
and western Germany is unimaginable anytime soon.”. Nearly 15 years later
and given the massive fiscal transfers from West to East Germany, these
insights may - unfortunately - still be correct.
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Figure 2: Productivity convergence, compared to the 2% convergence predic-
tion of Barro. Productivity convergence appears to have been fast from 1991
to 1993, so the prediction based on the 1991 numbers is far from the facts.
Applying the prediction on the basis of the numbers for 1993, however, works
surprisingly well. The data is from Burda (2006).
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Figure 3: Fiscal Transfers from West to East Germany.
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Figure 4: Migration Pattern for Germany.
38
−4 −3 −2 −1 0−4.5
−4
−3.5
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Zipfs law, East−West comp.
Log fract. max. size
Lo
g 
F(
x >
 si
ze
)
   all east
   all west
Figure 5: Comparing the distribution of city sizes in East and West Germany.
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Figure 6: Net migration rates for various age groups, East Germany. Only
people above age 50 stay in East Germany, all others gradually leave.
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Figure 7: Net migration rates for various age groups, East Germany, cal-
culated for inner-German migrants, i.e., excluding migration crossing the
German border.
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Figure 8: Gross and net migration of people, aged 18-29, into East Germany,
in percent of the 2003 population of that age group.
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Figure 9: Gross and net migration of people, aged 18-29, into East Germany,
in percent of the 2003 population of that age group. Here, only inner-German
migration is shown.
43
East West
Large cities:
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Large Cities, East Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Large Cities, West Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
Small cities:
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Small Cities, East Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Small Cities, West Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
Countryside:
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Country, East Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
1996 1998 2000 2002−5
0
5
Country, West Ger., Age Cat.
Year
%
 o
f 2
00
3 
po
pu
la
tio
n
18−29
30−49
>= 50
Figure 10: Net migration rates for various age groups and regions, comparing
East and West Germany.
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Figure 11: Net migration rates for various age groups and regions, comparing
East and West Germany, inner-German migration only.
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Figure 12: Migration patterns of 18-29 year olds.
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Figure 13: Migration patterns of 18-29 year olds, inner-German migration
only.
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Figure 14: A Graphical Representation of the Dynamics for the fraction n˜
of networked firm-worker pairs as a function of the ratio of non-networked
to networked firm-worker pairs, m/n. The equilibrium E (“East Germany”)
exhibits low average productivity, high unemployment and persistent emigra-
tion, compared to the equilibrium W (“West Germany”).
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